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AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 
Erwin Chemerinsky* 
EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC Acrs: .AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITU­
TION, 1776-1995. By David E. Kyvig. Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas. 1996. Pp. xx, 604. $55. 
The ultimate measure of a constitution is how it balances en­
trenchment and change. On the one hand, a constitution differs 
from all other laws in that it is much more difficult to revise. For 
example, the next session of Congress can amend or repeal a stat­
ute, but altering the U.S. Constitution requires a complex process 
involving supermajorities of both houses of Congress and the states. 
A constitution thus reflects a desire to place a society's core values 
of governance - such as the structure of government and the rights 
of individuals - in a document that is hard to revise. By enacting a 
constitution, society limits itself in an effort to protect the values it 
most cherishes. For a constitution to achieve this goal it must 
endure. 
But in order for a constitution to endure, it must contain mecha­
nisms for adaptation to changing circumstances. Changes in social 
organization, in technology, and in morality all require that the con­
stitution evolve. The agrarian slave society of 1787 is so vastly dif­
ferent from the world of the coming twenty-first century that it is 
unthinkable that the understandings of 200 years ago could solely 
govern modem society. Those drafting a constitution cannot possi­
bly imagine the myriad of issues that will arise decades and centu­
ries later. 
A constitution thus must mediate the competing desires for en­
trenchment and flexibility, for stability and change. Sometimes 
constitutions emphasize the former and make revisions impossible 
or very difficult. Long ago, in ancient Greece, Lycurgus, the ruler 
of Sparta, insisted that his laws not be changed until he returned 
from a long joumey.1 Lycurgus then killed himself to ensure that 
the laws not be altered, and they survived for 500 years.2 Some 
countries have constitutional provisions that are immune from revi-
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Southern Cali­
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1. See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitu­
tional Entrenchment, 29 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 251, 251 (1996). 
2. See id. 
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sion. The constitutions of Germany and Brazil expressly state that 
the division of power between the national and local governments is 
not subject to amendment.3 Morocco's constitution states that it 
may not be amended to eliminate the monarchy or Islam as the 
official religion.4 
Nations that have experienced foreign occupation often have 
provisions limiting amendment in the case of future foreign inva­
sions. For example, the constitution of the French Fourth Republic, 
adopted in 1946 in the wake of liberation from Nazi control, prohib­
ited amendment of the constitution "in case of occupation of all or 
part of the metropolitan territory by foreign force."5 
In fact, even the U.S. Constitution specifies certain matters that 
may not be changed, even by amendment. Article V, which details 
the amendment process, states that "no Amendment which may be 
made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall 
in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Sec­
tion of the first Article; and . . .  no State, without its Consent, shall 
be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. "6 The two clauses 
in Article I that could not be changed prohibited Congress from 
banning the importing of slaves and prevented a direct tax unless it 
was apportioned based on the census. 
On the other hand, some constitutions provide very little in the 
way of entrenchment or resistance to change. State constitutions 
generally are much easier to amend than the U.S. Constitution and 
have been amended much more frequently.7 The doctrine of Par­
liament's sovereignty in Great Britain means that legislative acts 
trump the constitution. As Professor David E. Kyvig8 observes: 
"As the concept of parliamentary supremacy emerged from notions 
that sovereignty belonged to the people rather than to the monarch 
and that Parliament legitimately represented the sovereign will, any 
thought of limiting Parliament's power to alter the terms of govern­
ment faded away" (p. 20). 
The key challenge for a constitution is to strike the optimal bal­
ance between entrenchment and flexibility. If a constitution makes 
3. See Ivo D. DuCHACEK, POWER MAPs: COMPARATIVE PoLmcs OF CoNSTifUTIONS 
210 (1973). 
4. See id. 
5. Id. (quoting FR. CONST. (constitution of the French Fourth Republic, 1946) art. 94). 
6. U.S. CONST. art. V. Article I, Section Nine, Clause One, prohibits Congress from 
prohibiting the importation of slaves until 1808. Clause four states: "No capitation, or other 
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before 
directed to be taken." 
7. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CoNSTifUTIONAL CHOICES 289 n.43 (1985); Developments in 
the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1353-56 
(1982). 
8. Professor of History, University of Akron. 
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change too difficult, it will obstruct necessary and desirable social 
reforms. Revolution will become the only way of altering the gov­
ernment. But if change is too easy, then a constitution fails to 
achieve its objective of protecting society's most cherished values 
from majoritarian control. 
The amendment process is thus not peripheral to the constitu­
tion, but is its essence. Professor Kyvig's new book, Explicit and 
Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1 776-1995, pro­
vides an excellent history of the amendment process, from the rati­
fication of the Constitution until 1995. Professor Kyvig shows that 
from its inception, the amendment process was integral to the very 
existence of the Constitution. For example, at the state ratifying 
conventions, supporters of the Constitution could answer objections 
by pointing to Article V and the ability to change imperfections 
(pp. 81, 85). Unlike the Articles of Confederation, which required 
unanimous consent of the states for amendments, the Constitution 
offered a more realistic process for change. Thus, state calls for a 
bill of rights could be met, not by defeating ratification until a new 
constitutional convention was held, but by the amendment process 
(pp. 81-85). As Professor Kyvig notes, "At several crucial junctures 
in the struggle over ratification, most notably in the Massachusetts, 
Virginia, and New York conventions, the promise of amendment 
swung the balance in favor of acceptance" (p. 85). 
Professor Kyvig's book describes in detail the attempts, success­
ful and unsuccessful, to amend the Constitution since 1787. The 
book provides a wealth of fascinating facts. For example, I had not 
known that James Madison, the crucial figure in drafting the Bill of 
Rights, almost was not elected to the first Congress. Patrick Henry, 
Madison's foe, successfully kept the Virginia legislature from choos­
ing Madison for the United States Senate and Madison's home 
county was gerrymandered into a largely anti-Federalist district (p. 
95). Madison defeated his opponent, James Monroe, for the House 
seat only after promising his commitment to adding a bill of rights 
to the Constitution. 
Even more important, I did not know that in 1861, on the eve of 
the Civil War, both houses of Congress ratified an amendment to 
protect the institution of slavery. The amendment, introduced by 
Thomas Corwin and supported by President Lincoln, provided: 
"No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will au­
thorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within 
any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of 
persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State" (p. 151). 
The House of Representatives passed the amendment by a vote of 
133 to 65, and the Senate did so by a vote of 24 to 12 (p. 151). The 
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amendment was meant to prevent the Civil War, and it is frighten­
ing to fathom the course of American history if it had succeeded. 
Kyvig's careful history of the amendment process shows how 
well Article V strikes a balance between entrenchment and flexibil­
ity. Over the course of American history, more than 10,000 amend­
ments have been proposed through the mechanisms provided in 
Article V of the Constitution. Only thirty-three received approval 
by both the House and the Senate, and just twenty-seven have been 
ratified by the states. Yet, most of the ratified amendments, by any 
measure, were desirable revisions to the Constitution. The Bill of 
Rights was crucial to the ratification of the document and has been 
key in protecting basic liberties. The post-Civil War Amendments 
were essential in ending slavery and ensuring the federalization of 
fundamental rights. Many of the amendments were crucial in 
perfecting democracy by extending the franchise to blacks, to 
women, to the poor, and to eighteen-year-olds. 
Professor Kyvig's history of the amendment process, and consid­
eration of the tension between constraint and change, raise two 
questions. First, what are the assumptions and implications of hav­
ing a brief constitution that is relatively difficult to change? Profes­
sor Kyvig's book provides a powerful reminder that this is the core 
nature of the U.S. Constitution. Professor Kyvig's book reveals 
how much such a constitution is based on trust in the government it 
creates and how much it relies on a judiciary with the authority to 
interpret and adapt the constitution to a world so vastly different 
from what the Framers could have imagined. 
Second, when should the Constitution be amended? In the past 
few years, countless proposals have been introduced in Congress to 
amend the Constitution to achieve goals ranging from balancing the 
budget, to allowing school prayer, to prohibiting abortion, to out­
lawing flag burning. In light of Professor Kyvig's history, is it possi­
ble to develop a theory of when amendments are worthy? 
Professor Kyvig's enterprise is historical, recounting the successful 
and unsuccessful attempts at amendment. Professor Kyvig offers no 
conclusions as to when the amendment process is appropriate and 
when it should remain unused. Yet his history offers an excellent 
vehicle for considering the proper use of the amendment process to 
preserve the delicate balance between entrenchment and flexibility. 
This review essay uses Professor Kyvig's careful, well-written 
history as the starting point for examining these two questions. 
Although Professor Kyvig's book is not the first recent attempt to 
examine the amendment process,9 it is the most systematic history 
to date. This excellent book should be of great interest to anyone 
9. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA (1993); 
JOHN R. VILE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN TIIE UNITED STATES (1994); REsPONDING TO 
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interested in the amendment process or, indeed, in the Constitution 
of the United States. 
I. WHAT ARE THE ASSUMPTIONS OF A RELATIVELY SHORT 
CONSTITUTION THAT Is DIFFICULT TO AMEND? 
In April 1997, I was elected by Los Angeles voters to a fifteen­
person commission to rewrite the Los Angeles City Charter. The 
Charter has many of the characteristics of a constitution.10 It cre­
ates the structure of government and allocates power among its 
branches. It prescribes much of how the government operates. It 
can protect rights, so long as its safeguards are greater than those 
contained in federal or state law. The current Los Angeles Charter 
was adopted by the voters in 1925. It has been amended over 400 
times by voter initiative, and it is several hundred pages long. 
The Charter's contrast to the U.S. Constitution could not be 
more striking. The Constitution is a blueprint for a government. In 
the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, " [a] constitution, to con­
tain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great pow­
ers will adinit, and of all the means by which they may be carried 
into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and 
could scarcely be embraced by the human mind."11 Marshall then 
uttered some of the most famous words in all of the United States 
Reports: "In considering this question, then, we must never forget, 
that it is a constitution we are expounding."12 In contrast, the Los 
Angeles City Charter is much more an operations manual than a 
blueprint. 
The amendment processes of the two documents are quite dif­
ferent. The Constitution is difficult to alter and has been amended 
just twenty-seven times in 220 years. The Charter is easy to revise; 
it takes just a majority vote in an election to approve a Charter 
amendment. The differences between the U.S. Constitution and 
the L.A. Charter cannot be explained by the level of government or 
the varying functions of the two documents. A constitution could 
be just as long and just as detailed as the Los Angeles Charter, and 
a charter could be just as brief as the U.S. Constitution. 
Simultaneously reading Kyvig's book and struggling with the 
Charter revision process in Los Angeles bring to mind the question: 
What are the assumptions of creating or being governed by a short 
document that is relatively difficult to change? Kyvig's book helps 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL .AMENDMENT (Sanford 
Levinson ed., 1995). 
10. Charter of the City of Los Angeles Annotated (Revision 7, 1990 Edition Revised, 
1997). 
11. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
12. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. 
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show that the style of the United States Constitution rests on two 
premises. 
First, a short constitution that is relatively immune from change 
assumes great trust in those who will be governing under it. Fre­
quently it is said that the Framers of the Constitution acted on a 
distrust of those who would be governing them in the future. Cer­
tainly, the Constitution's division of powers, via separation of pow­
ers and federalism, is based on such distrust. The strong call for a 
Bill of Rights, which Kyvig describes in detail (pp. 66-109), reflected 
a widely perceived need to further limit those who would be 
governing. 
Yet it is striking how much detail the Framers left out of the 
Constitution, with the trust that government officials would be true 
to the spirit of the document. Perhaps most notably, the power of 
judicial review is not specified, but the Framers likely assumed it as 
implicit in a Constitution of limited powers with an Article III judi­
ciary.13 This is but one of countless examples of major matters that 
the Constitution leaves to those who would govern under it. For 
example, the Constitution does not mandate the funding of any of­
fice or agency. Nothing in the Constitution expressly requires that 
Congress provide money for the operation of the executive or the 
judiciary.14 
The Constitution does not mention many basic powers of gov­
ernment. Although the Constitution specifies who has the appoint­
ment power, it is silent about removal authority.15 This is not a 
trivial power; it is crucial to a President's ability to control the exec­
utive branch, · and the issue of removal was the core of the only suc­
cessful effort to impeach a President. The Constitution says nothing 
about countless other issues that undoubtedly could have been 
foreseen in 1787. For example, no provision explicitly addresses 
who has the power to recognize foreign governments. 
The lack of detail is also reflected in the broad phrasing of so 
many of the Constitution's provisions. Article II, for example, pro­
vides for impeachment for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors."16 The Framers offered no criteria as to what 
constitute "high crimes and misdemeanors," and the Constitution 
outlines only the most basic procedures for the impeachment 
process. 
13. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. {1 Cranch) 137 {1803); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 
490 {Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed., 1961). 
14. There is, of course, the prohibition against decreasing judicial salaries for Article III 
judges. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1. 
15. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 {1988) {discussing the removal power of the 
President and Congress's ability to limit it); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 
602 (1935) (same); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 {1926) (same). 
16. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4. 
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For all of these examples, and countless more, the Constitution 
could have been very specific. As I suggested above, what has been 
overlooked, and this is evident in reading Professor Kyvig's book, is 
the degree to which the Constitution was based on trust in those 
who would be governing to work out these matters and the knowl­
edge that there was an amendment process to solve the problems 
that might develop. The conventional wisdom about the Constitu­
tion emphasizes the Framers' distrust in government, as reflected in 
their desire for separation of powers, federalism, and ultimately a 
bill of rights. This account is undoubtedly accurate, but equally im­
portant is the extent to which the Constitution reflects a profound 
trust in those who would be governing under it. 
Moreover, when the Constitution is viewed in this light, it is 
striking that at a time of relatively great public distrust and cynicism 
about government, trust remains in the basic framework set out by 
the Constitution. Kyvig's book does not discuss a single proposal to 
replace the Constitution with a modem document. Indeed, Kyvig 
shows that proposals for a constitutional convention for limited 
purposes, such as for a balanced budget amendment, are fiercely 
opposed based on the fear that the convention might seek to pro­
pose a broader overhaul in the document (pp. 440-42). The 
profound public trust in the Constitution is one of its most impor­
tant features, and the one most often taken for granted. Professor 
Kyvig's analysis shows how much Article V's mechanisms for 
amendment have been crucial to this public confidence since the 
Constitution's inception. 
Reading Kyvig's book made clear the challenge for us in writing 
a new Los Angeles Charter or for anyone attempting to draft a new 
state constitution or city charter. A short document is possible if 
there is confidence in those who will hold office and confidence in 
the process the document allows for its change. At a time of a loss 
of public confidence in government at all levels, is it possible to 
write a blueprint rather than a legal code? Every detail in a docu­
ment like the Los Angeles Charter is there because a constituency 
wanted the protection of details. How can such groups be satisfied 
that their interests will be adequately safeguarded without very spe­
cific delineations? 
A second assumption demonstrated by Kyvig's book involves 
the nature of the amendment process. An understanding of the 
Constitution as a short document that is relatively immune from 
change provides powerful support for the view that the Constitu­
tion's meaning should evolve by judicial interpretation as well as by 
amendment. The debate over the method of constitutional inter­
pretation is a familiar one. Over the last two decades, it frequently 
has been characterized as one between originalism, sometimes 
1568 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1561 
called interpretivism, and nonoriginalism, sometimes termed 
noninterpretivism. Originalism is the view that "judges deciding 
constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms 
that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution."17 In 
contrast, nonoriginalism is the "contrary view that courts should go 
beyond that set of references and enforce norms that cannot be dis­
covered within the four comers of the document."18 
Originalists believe that the Constitution should evolve solely by 
amendment.19 If there is to be a right to use contraceptives or a 
right to abortion, originalists would say that the Constitution must 
be amended. In contrast, nonoriginalists believe that since the Con­
stitution's meaning is not limited to what the framers intended, the 
meaning and application of constitutional provisions can evolve by 
interpretation as well as by amendment.20 The fact that the Fram­
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to prohibit gender 
discrimination or to apply the Bill of Rights to the states is not deci­
sive for the nonoriginalist in deciding what the Constitution means. 
The Supreme Court, at various times, has professed adherence 
to both of these competing philosophies. In South Carolina v. 
United States, in 1905, the Court stated: "The Constitution is a writ­
ten instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it 
meant when adopted it means now."21 But equally strong state­
ments from the Court reject an originalist approach. In Home 
Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, in 1934, the Court declared: 
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a 
century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution 
meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time. 
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its 
adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of 
the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the 
framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have 
placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation. It was to 
guard against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall 
uttered the memorable warning - "We must never forget that it is a 
constitution we are expounding."22 
17. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980). 
18. Id. 
19. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, G. Edward White's Apology for Judicial Activism, 63 TEXAS 
L. REv. 367, 372 (1984); William Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful 
Contributions of Special Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 209, 234 n.66 (1983). 
20. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause should be interpreted according to contem­
porary norms); see also PETER IRONS, BRENNAN vs. REHNQUIST. THE BATILE FOR THE 
CONSTITUTION (1994); Bernard Schwartz, Brennan vs. Rehnquist - Mirror Images in Consti­
tutional Construction, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 213 (1994). 
21. 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. ( 4 Wheat.) 316, 407 
(1819) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
22. 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934). 
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Professor Kyvig's book is directly relevant to this debate be­
cause the ease of amendment is crucial in appraising whether 
change can occur only through that process. Professor Kyvig's 
book demonstrates that perceptions about the relative ease and dif­
ficulty of amendments have varied over time (pp. 188-89, 216-18, 
240-41). Overall, though, Professor Kyvig's book shows a consis­
tent recognition that amendment was a difficult process and likely 
to occur only relatively infrequently. 
Therefore, to say, as originalists do, that the Constitution may 
be modified only by amendment is to say that there will be virtually 
no evolution in the meaning of the document. As noted above, 
though, constitutional evolution is essential for the document to 
deal with modem problems and to adapt to changes, such as in 
technology and social values. Unless the Constitution evolves, over 
time ever greater areas of governance will be left solely to the 
majoritarian processes. The Constitution's promise of constraint 
and entrenched protections will increasingly be lost. For example, 
it is highly unlikely that the Constitution could have been amended 
successfully to eliminate school segregation or require reapportion­
ment of legislatures. These examples show why it would be wrong 
for the Constitution to evolve solely by amendment: the rights of 
minorities, political or racial, should not be made to depend solely 
on a supermajority's willingness to act. 
Moreover, evolution solely by amendment is inferior because it 
is unlikely that society would be willing to devote the energy and 
resources to amend the Constitution constantly. If all evolution 
were by amendment, frequent amendments would need to be ad­
ded to the Constitution. But Professor Kyvig's history shows that 
the cumbersome nature of the amendment process, and the need 
for approval from so many different institutions, makes it highly 
unlikely that a sufficient number of amendments would be ratified. 
Even more important, frequent amendment could create 
problems of its own. If amendments were routine and not excep­
tional, there is reason to fear that precisely when it matters most, 
constitutional protections might be eliminated by amendment. The 
Framers feared that in times of crisis there would be strong pres­
sures to centralize power and to compromise rights. Making 
amendment difficult protects against those temptations. The obsta­
cles to successful amendments that Professor Kyvig describes are 
thus integral to the Constitution's central function of entrenchment. 
Also, if amendments were frequent, the Constitution would lose 
its symbolic value as a brief, abstract document. The comparison to 
state constitutions and city charters is again illustrative. Joseph 
Long observed over 80 years ago: 
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The federal constitution . . . has happily escaped the fate that has 
befallen the constitutions of the states. Not only are they subject to 
constant change, but they have long since ceased to be constitutions in 
a true sense. Instead of embodying broad general propositions of fun­
damental permanent law, they now exhibit the prolixity of a code and 
consist largely of mere legislation. No one now entertains any partic­
ular respect for a state constitution. It has little more dignity than an 
ordinary act of the legislature.23 
More recently, Laurence Tribe similarly remarked how the "clut­
tered" nature of state constitutions explains why they "rarely com­
mand the respect routinely p aid to federal constitutional 
guarantees. "24 
Thus, crucial to the very nature of the Constitution is an amend­
ment process, that as Professor Kyvig shows, is likely to be used 
successfully only relatively infrequently. The result is that essential 
constitutional evolution must occur by judicial interpretation and 
not just through the rare and occasional amendment. 
II. WHEN AMEND THE CONSTITUTION? 
Reading Professor Kyvig's history of the amendment process 
causes one to feel relief that the Framers made constitutional revi­
sions relatively difficult. He describes many efforts to amend the 
Constitution that thankfully failed. For example, James Madison's 
first proposed amendment to the Constitution would have limited 
each member of the House of Representatives to representing a 
district of no more than 50,000 residents. If ratified, the amend­
ment, over time, would have led to a House that was truly unwork­
able. Kyvig notes: "If constituencies were limited to 50,000 
citizens, the nature of republican government in a nation of 250 mil­
lion people would change dramatically. A representative would 
bear a very different relationship to 50,000 constituents than to the 
present average of nearly 600,000 and to 4,999 colleagues than to 
the current 434" (p. 470). 
Most striking, as mentioned above, it defies comprehension to 
imagine the course of U.S. history if the amendment proposed by 
Congress in 1861 to institutionalize slavery had been adopted (p. 
151). More recently, serious efforts to amend the Constitution to 
overturn the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions failed 
(pp. 371-79), and the assurance of one-person, one-vote is now al­
most universally accepted as an essential protection of the demo­
cratic process.2s 
23. Joseph R. Long, Tinkering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573, 580 (1915). 
24. TRIBE, supra note 7, at 289 n.43. 
25. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 17, at 101-02. But see ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA 87 (1990) (criticizing the decisions on the grounds that the "Warren majority's new 
constitutional doctrine was supported by nothing"). 
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But Kyvig's history also shows that it is wrong to assume that 
the rejection of proposed constitutional amendments always, in 
hindsight, should be regarded as a good thing. Kyvig recites in de­
tail the fight over the Equal Rights Amendment (pp. 395-419). The 
National Women's party began drafting an equal rights amendment 
in September 1921 and unanimously endorsed it in 1923 (p. 396). 
"[The] first equal rights amendment, drafted by [Alice] Paul and 
introduced in Congress in December 1923 by Republican Senator 
Charles Curtis, simply declared, 'Men and women shall have equal 
rights throughout the United States and every place subject to its 
jurisdiction' " (p. 396). Even after reading Kyvig's description of 
the history, it is astounding and disheartening that the country 
could not approve a basic statement that "[e]quality of rights under 
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
any State on account of sex."26 
Other beneficial constitutional amendments also never were 
adopted. After the Supreme Court invalidated a federal law 
prohibiting child labor in Hammer v. Dagenhart,27 a serious effort 
was made to amend the Constitution to outlaw such practices (pp. 
255-61, 307-13). The proposed amendment to forbid child labor 
never was ratified. The Supreme Court changed course in 1937, 
later expressly overruling Hammer, and thus the amendment be­
came unnecessary.28 Yet I think it is wrong to say that the ultimate 
prohibition of child labor shows that the child labor amendment 
was unnecessary. For over twenty years, from 1918 when the Court 
struck down the federal child labor law until the Court permitted 
the regulation, countless children were hurt who might have been 
protected by a constitutional amendment. 
Another example of a desirable amendment proposed by Con­
gress and not ratified by the states would have granted residents of 
the District of Columbia representation in Congress (pp. 394-95, 
420-25). Under any theory of representative government it is im­
possible to justify the fact that those who live in the District of Co­
lumbia are not represented by voting members in the House of 
26. Proposed Equal Rights Amendment. There can, of course, be disagreement over 
how much it would have mattered to add the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution. 
First, I believe that it would have been an important symbolic declaration of gender equality. 
Second, the amendment likely would have meant strict scrutiny for gender classifications, 
rather than the intermediate scrutiny that the Court has used since 1976. See Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 197 {1976); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 {1996) (reaf­
firming the use of intermediate scrutiny but stating that there must be an "exceedingly per­
suasive justification" for gender classifications). Some cases likely would have been decided 
differently if the Equal Rights Amendment had been in place, such as Michael M. v. Superior 
Court, 450 U.S. 464 {1981), which allowed sex-based discrimination in statutory rape laws, 
and Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 {1981), which upheld male-only draft registration. 
27. 247 U.S. 251 {1918). 
28. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941) (overruling Hammer). 
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Representatives or the Senate. Although Congress passed an 
amendment to correct the problem, only sixteen states had ap­
proved it before the time period for its ratification expired (p. 423). 
The rejection was not based on a defensible principle, but rather 
based on the perception that the District of Columbia's African­
American-majority population likely would elect Democrats to the 
House and the Senate. 
It should not be assumed, however, that all amendments that 
made it through the gauntlet and were adopted were desirable 
changes. Kyvig provides a detailed description of how the Eight­
eenth Amendment, mandating prohibition of alcohol, was enacted 
(pp. 218-26), how quickly it came to be regarded as a colossal mis­
take, and how the Twenty-first Amendment repealed it just thirteen 
years later (pp. 261-67). 
For me, the key question in reading Professor Kyvig's book is 
whether any lessons can be drawn from history as to when the Con­
stitution should be amended. In the 1990s, as Republicans gained 
control over both the House and the Senate, countless proposals 
have been introduced to amend the Constitution for matters rang­
ing from ensuring a balanced budget, to prohibiting flag burning, to 
allowing school prayer, to reforming campaign finance, to ensuring 
religious equality, to changing the procedures for imposing new 
taxes, to safeguarding victims' rights. Is it possible from a study of 
history, such as Kyvig's, to derive criteria as to when the Constitu­
tion should be amended and when left unchanged? Professor Kyvig 
offers no such analysis - though, in fairness, that was not his goal 
in the book. He sought to provide a history of the amendment pro­
cess and not a normative analysis of when it should be used. 
Recently, others have attempted to articulate criteria for when 
constitutional amendment is appropriate. In August 1997, a group 
called Citizens for the Constitution released a draft titled, 'Great 
and Extraordinary Occasions': Developing Standards for Constitu­
tional Change. 29 A distinguished group that included law profes­
sors Michael Seidman, Kathleen Sullivan, and Don Wallace and 
attorneys Alan Morrison, Robert Peck, and Peter Wallison pre­
pared the report. The draft report urges the need for restraint in 
amending the Constitution and presents criteria for when amend­
ment is appropriate. 
Specifically, the draft report states the following principles for 
constitutional amendment: 
1. Constitutional amendments should address matters of more than 
immediate concern that are likely to be recognized as of abiding im­
portance by subsequent generations. 
29. Citizens for the Constitution, 'Great and Extraordinary Occasions': Developing Stan­
dards for Constitutional Change (Aug. 1997) (unpublished draft report on file with author). 
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2. Constitutional amendments should not make our system less po­
litically responsive except to the extent necessary to protect individual 
rights. 
3. Constitutional amendments should be utilized only when there 
are significant practical or legal obstacles to the achievement of the 
same objectives by other means. 
4. Constitutional amendments should not be adopted when they 
would damage the cohesiveness of constitutional doctrine as a whole. 
5. Constitutional amendments should embody enforceable, and not 
purely aspirational, standards. 
6. Proponents of constitutional amendments should attempt to think 
through and articulate the consequences of their proposals, including 
the ways in which the amendments would interact with other constitu­
tional provisions and principles. 
7. Constitutional amendments should be enacted using procedures 
designed to ensure full and fair debate. 
8. Constitutional amendments should have a non-extendable dead­
line for ratification by the states so as to ensure that there is a contem­
poraneous consensus by Congress and the states that the amendment 
is desirable.30 
It is difficult to disagree with any of these principles. Some 
seem unassailable. For example, who could possibly object to the 
sixth principle, which urges reflection as to the effect of proposed 
amendments on other aspects of the Constitution, or the seventh 
principle, which calls for full and fair debate in amending the Con­
stitution? The first through fifth proposals likewise seem desirable 
and almost axiomatic. 
In addition, the very recent experience with the ratification of 
the Twenty-seventh Amendment shows the wisdom of the eighth 
proposal. Kyvig describes the story of the Twenty-seventh Amend­
ment (pp. 462-70), which prohibits pay raises to members of Con­
gress during their terms of office, and liow it was ratified by the 
states and added to the Constitution nearly 200 years after it was 
proposed by Congress. An amendment should be deemed ratified 
when a supermajority of states, as prescribed in Article V, approves 
it. The problem when ratification occurs over decades or centuries 
is that there may never have been a time when a super-majority 
approved it, but rather different groups at varying times. 
In fact, Kyvig points out that there are several other amend­
ments, passed by Congress and still pending before the states with­
out a time limit for ratification, such as "Madison's first amendment 
limiting the size of congressional districts to 50,000 residents, the 
1810 amendment banning citizens from accepting foreign titles, the 
1861 amendment guaranteeing the continuation of slavery in states 
30. Id. 
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where it then existed, and the 1924 child labor amendment" (p. 
469). 
Yet, appraising these principles after reading Kyvig's history 
raises questions as to whether the Citizens for the Constitution's 
criteria are useful in distinguishing good from bad amendments. 
For example, I certainly agree with the first proposition that "Con­
stitutional amendments should address matters of more than imme­
diate concern that are likely to be recognized as of abiding 
importance by subsequent generations."31 Yet I imagine that the 
supporters of any amendment would defend their proposal as deal­
ing with matters of "abiding importance." Kyvig shows that sup­
porters of Prohibition, surely regarded as the largest mistake in the 
use of the amendment process, defended it as dealing with a signifi­
cant and long-term problem (pp. 218-26). Kyvig observes that "[i]n 
1919 national prohibition appeared to be a widely supported inno­
vation in public policy and constitutionalism" (p. 225). 
The Citizens for the Constitution draft report uses the proposed 
flag desecration amendment as an illustration of a reform that does 
not meet the first proposition. Although I share their opposition to 
the amendment, I am skeptical as to whether supporters of the pro­
posal would accept that conclusion. Those favoring a flag desecra­
tion amendment likely would argue that the flag is a unique and 
abiding symbol that should be protected now and forever. 
More generally, I question whether it is possible at any moment 
in time to know which issues will be of concern only briefly and 
which will have lasting significance. No one could have known in 
1920 whether the Supreme Court's preclusion of federal laws 
prohibiting child labor would have lasted for years or decades. 
Also, significant social problems might exist that require immediate 
attention by amendment, even if they tum out to be relatively 
short-term in duration. Again, the failed child labor amendment is 
illustrative. Even if it only would have had legal significance for 
twenty years, during that time it might have protected the health 
and lives of innumerable children. The Twenty-fourth Amendment, 
which prohibited poll taxes, likely was not dealing with a problem 
of enduring significance; few states still had them when the Amend­
ment passed, and in those few they likely were on the way out. The 
Amendment, though, mattered in that it extended the franchise and 
symbolically reaffirmed the right of every person, regardless of 
wealth, to participate in the democratic process. 
Perhaps more significant from a constitutional perspective is the 
question of ,the proper use of the amendment process as a check on 
the Supreme Court. Kyvig's book details four instances in which 
31. Id. 
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the Constitution was amended to overturn Supreme Court deci­
sions. The Eleventh Amendment, which protects state govern­
ments from being sued in federal court, was ratified to overturn the 
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia32 (pp. 111-14). The Four­
teenth Amendment's declaration that "[a]ll persons born or natu­
ralized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re­
side"33 overrules the Court's contrary ruling in Dred Scott v. Sand­
ford34 (p. 156-163). The Sixteenth Amendment, which authorizes 
the personal income tax, was adopted to overrule the Court's deci­
sion in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 35 (pp. 193-218). Fi­
nally, the Twenty-sixth Amendment, which protected the right of 
those over eighteen to vote, was enacted in response to Oregon v. 
Mitchelf36 that invalidated a federal law that created the same re­
quirement (pp. 363-68). 
If it is accepted, as I argued in Part I, that the Supreme Court 
should have discretion in interpreting the Constitution to ensure 
necessary evolution, then the amendment process becomes crucial 
as the only direct political check on the judiciary. When is it appro­
priate to use the amendment process to overturn a Supreme Court 
decision that is regarded as seriously misguided? Although I disa­
gree with virtually all of the contemporary proposals to overturn 
Supreme Court decisions by constitutional amendments, I cannot 
yet articulate a reason why this is an illegitimate use of the amend­
ing process. To the contrary, Kyvig's history shows that since its 
inception the amendment process has been used in just this way. 
The first amendment adopted after the Bill of Rights, the Eleventh 
Amendment, was enacted to overturn a Supreme Court decision, 
and there have been countless proposals to try by amendment to 
overrule other decisions. 
Again, I do not disagree with the effort to articulate criteria for 
when the Constitution should be amended. Professor Kyvig's book 
puts that issue directly before the reader. Nor do I disagree with 
the initial efforts by Citizens for the Constitution. I think, however, 
that Professor Kyvig's excellent history shows that developing use­
ful criteria will be a very difficult task. Good proposals for amend­
ments have been defeated and bad ones adopted; bad ones have 
been defeated and many good ones adopted. Supporters of all 
thought that they were making essential reforms; opponents of all 
claimed that they were protecting the majesty of the Constitution. 
32. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
33. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
34. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
35. 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
36. 400 U.S. 112 (1971). 
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Reading the descriptions of the contemporaneous debates over the 
proposals shows how difficult it is at any moment in time to assess 
how an amendment later will be regarded. Remember, even Presi­
dent Lincoln supported an amendment to deny Congress "the 
power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic 
institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or ser­
vice by the laws of said State" (p. 151). 
CONCLUSION 
Professor David Kyvig's book begins by quoting President 
George Washington's farewell address, that the Constitution "till 
changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is 
sacredly obligatory upon all" (p. 1). Washington further said: "If in 
the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the 
constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected 
by an amendment in the way the Constitution designates" (p. 1). 
Professor Kyvig's book provides an excellent history of the use 
of this amending process and a powerful argument that the mecha­
nisms created by Article V of the Constitution are at the very core 
of the Constitution's existence and survival. More than the Framers 
ever could have imagined, they created a process that provided an 
almost ideal balance between stability and change, between en­
trenchment and flexibility. 
As the Elected Los Angeles Charter Reform Commission strug­
gles with the task of proposing a new "constitution" for Los Ange­
les, Professor Kyvig's book provides crucial insights. The issues for 
the Charter are remarkably the same as those confronted in draft­
ing a constitution. What branches of government should be created 
and how should power be allocated among them? Should power be 
decentralized, such as by empowering boroughs or neighborhood 
councils with tasks that previously had been done in a centralized 
fashion? Should there be an enforceable bill of rights and if so, 
what rights should be protected? 
The central tensions identified in Professor Kyvig's book also 
are identical in writing a constitution or a charter. If successful in 
the Charter reform process, we are writing a document to last for 
decades and to deal with problems that we cannot begin to imagine. 
The document must constrain and check, but it must be adaptable 
too. The document must be general enough to be comprehensible 
and unifying, but specific enough to create a workable government. 
Professor Kyvig's book forces attention on how the document 
should be subject to change. What mechanism for revision will best 
strike the balance between constraint and flexibility, allowing 
needed reforms, but avoiding too frequent modifications? 
